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IntroductIon
Education policymakers at all levels of government have long been interested 
in finding ways to entice more students to go to college. This goal has been 
driven by the belief that, as people acquire more education, they not only 
reap personal benefits from their investment in education, but they also 
create spillover benefits for others in society (referred to by economists as 
“positive externalities”) in ways such as raising their community’s standard 
of living, reducing crime rates, and enhancing the region’s quality of life 
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(Blundell, Dearden, Goodman, & Reed, 2000; Dee, 2003; McMahon, 2009; 
Moretti, 2004; Venniker, 2000). Accordingly, governments hope that increases 
in the college-going rate will raise both pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains 
for their region.
The challenge facing governments is how to entice more students to acquire 
a postsecondary education so that a socially optimum number of students in 
the region attend college. The theory of investment in human capital (Mincer, 
1958) holds that students make decisions about their level of education based 
on estimates of the private costs of and benefits from going to college. As a 
result, governments may introduce policies (such as financial subsidies to 
students or to designated postsecondary institutions) that reduce the private 
cost to students of investing in human capital, which in turn would cause 
some students who were at the margin for attending college to conclude that 
it is now in their best interest to pursue a postsecondary education. Another 
way to reap these positive externalities is for governments to convince more 
residents to stay in their region for some period of time; otherwise, the spill-
over benefits from the financial support for higher education would accrue 
to the regions where the students migrate.
State governments play an important role in providing funding for higher 
education, with more than $75 billion being appropriated for postsecondary 
education in 2009–2010 (Grapevine, 2010). The way in which states finance 
higher education, however, differs substantially from the federal approach. 
The federal government relies primarily on grants to faculty to support basic 
research and on need-based grants to students that can be used at institutions 
across the United States. In contrast, states on average provide more than 90% 
of their assistance to designated (typically public) colleges and universities in 
the form of appropriations. (See Tables 1 and 3.) The hope among policymak-
ers is that colleges will use a portion of appropriations to reduce the tuition 
rates charged to state residents and thus make college more affordable for 
them. While state appropriations generally kept pace with inflation during 
this time (Grapevine, 2010), they have accounted for an increasingly smaller 
share of total expenditures on college campuses (Heller, 2006). Winston’s 
(1999) notion that price is equal to cost minus subsidies in higher education 
helps explain why tuition rates have risen faster than inflation for the last 
decade (College Board, 2010), leading to concern that higher education will 
become less affordable to many students (see also Bound & Turner, 2007). 
This relationship between tuition and appropriations is complex (Calhoun 
& Kamerschen, 2010), and Rizzo (2006) and Koshal and Koshal (2000) found 
that, when state funding is constrained, tuition rates increase.
In addition to appropriations, however, states also provide financial 
assistance directly to students in the form of either need-based grants or 
merit-based grants. Need-based grants are given to state residents based on 
their income levels and ability to pay for college, while merit-based grants 
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are awarded primarily on measures of academic performance such as grade 
point average or standardized test scores. One important difference between 
the state and federal approaches to grants is that states usually restrict the 
funds to be used at institutions within the state’s boundaries to reduce out-
migration, whereas federal grants are portable across state lines. There is a 
wide range of need-based and merit-based state grant programs in place 
throughout the United States. In 2008, all 50 states awarded some financial 
assistance to students in the form of need-based grants, with the dollar 
amounts ranging from a high of more than $875 million (California) to a 
low of $163,000 (Wyoming).
Similarly, in 2008, 42 states awarded at least some financial assistance to 
students on the basis of merit. These programs vary in terms of the criteria 
for eligibility for receiving aid, the size of the grant, the institutions where the 
grants can be used, and whether aid is contingent on academic performance 
in college or other stipulations. Delaney and Ness (2010) have recently de-
veloped a more complete typology of state merit aid programs that is help-
ful for understanding how these programs differ across the United States. 
A further complexity is that some state grant programs have both a merit 
and a need component. For example, eligibility in the Twenty-first Century 
Scholars program in Indiana is limited to students who are both low income 
(need) and who have a C average or better in high school (merit). Despite 
these nuances, state aid programs tend to be categorized as either “merit-
based” or “need-based” by agencies such as the National Association of State 
Scholarship and Grant Aid Programs (NASSGAP).
States have chosen different approaches to using these three mechanisms to 
financially support higher education. As shown by Toutkoushian and Shafiq 
(2010), North Carolina, New Mexico, and New Jersey can be described as 
“high financial aid and high appropriation” states because their per-pupil 
amounts for each exceed the national averages. At the other extreme, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Oregon are states with both low per-pupil 
appropriations and financial aid.
An important trend in the last 10 to 15 years, however, is that states gener-
ally have been allocating more financial support for higher education directly 
to students in the form of need-based and merit-based grants/scholarships 
and loans (Heller, 2006). In particular, since 1993, 17 states have implemented 
broad-based merit-aid programs in which financial assistance is given to large 
numbers of students who meet performance targets. These broad-based aid 
programs typically have lower performance criteria than are used in smaller 
and more selective state merit aid programs. For example, the broad-based 
merit aid program in Arkansas only requires students to attain a high school 
GPA of 2.50, which enables approximately 60% of state students to potentially 
qualify for the grant (Dynarski, 2004). Despite the widespread attention—and 
concern—that has been given to the growth of broad-based programs such 
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as Georgia’s HOPE scholarship, state grants represent only a relatively small 
share of total state support for higher education.
It is not clear which of these three forms of state financial assistance 
for higher education—appropriations, need-based grants, or merit-based 
grants—is most effective in enticing students to go to college and stay 
in-state for their postsecondary education. Some (Heller & Marin, 2002; 
Toutkoushian & Shafiq, 2010) contend that, if given to the right students, 
need-based financial aid should be a better means than appropriations for 
increasing the college-going rate in states because more students who benefit 
from appropriations would have gone to college without the aid. However, 
Toutkoushian and Shafiq (2010) and Doyle (2007a, 2007b) note that it can be 
difficult to properly target state need-based grants at those who would most 
benefit from them. Likewise, because higher-achieving students should be 
more likely than lower-achieving students to go to college without financial 
aid, there is concern that merit-based aid programs would be less effective 
than need-based grants at increasing the college-going rate. A counter argu-
ment can be made, however, that merit aid programs provide students with 
an incentive to increase their academic performance, which would then lead 
more students to go to college (Dynarski, 2004).
The question of how state governments can best utilize financial policy to 
generate and retain positive externalities is very important for many higher 
education stakeholders. As noted by Perna and Titus (2004), “Policymakers 
and researchers disagree about the most appropriate balance between direct 
appropriations to institutions to reduce the sticker price and support to 
students through financial aid” (p. 503). It is therefore surprising that little 
empirical attention has been given to the relative impacts of these three forms 
of state support (Doyle, 2006, 2007a; Hearn & Longanecker, 1985; Perna & 
Titus, 2004). Despite Dynarski’s (2004) observation that “subsidies for college 
students have historically taken the form of low tuition at public colleges 
and universities” (p. 63) and Long’s (2004) description of appropriations as 
a form of in-kind subsidy, appropriations are often ignored in discussions 
of state financial support to students. The studies that have appeared in the 
literature usually focus on one form of state funding without considering 
the effects of the other options that states could use to achieve their goal. 
For example, while studies of broad-based state merit aid programs (Corn-
well, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2004; Zhang & Ness, 2010) have 
improved our understanding of how the introduction of these programs 
affect student behavior, they did not compare and contrast the effects of 
these programs with appropriations and need-based grants. Other studies 
such as Heller (1999) and St. John, Chung, Musoba, and Simmons (2006) 
could not adequately study merit aid programs because they examined years 
prior to their implementation. 
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Studies of state financing should focus attention both on access to higher 
education, as measured by the percentage of high school graduates going on 
to college, and on the outmigration of students, as captured by the percent-
age of students going out of state for college. Each facet is important to state 
policymakers because a state must entice more students to go to college and 
compel more students to stay in the state for some period of time to benefit 
from their investment. Although Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006), 
Zhang and Ness (2010), and several others examined the effects of aid on 
both access and migration, other studies restricted their analysis to overall 
access to higher education regardless of migration.
Finally, it is important to consider how the various forms of state financial 
assistance affect the types of postsecondary institutions students attend. The 
effects of different state options on student choice could depend on whether 
financing is in the form of an in-kind subsidy (as is true for appropriations 
and many need-based and merit-based grants) and where the subsidy can be 
used. Some grants may be restricted to four-year institutions, for example, 
and assistance that covers the full tuition at either a two-year or four-year 
institution will translate into different dollar subsidies to those who attend 
two-year and four-year institutions, which can then affect student choice 
between the two sectors.
In this study, we use panel data for all 50 states from 1988 to 2008 and 
a fixed effects/difference-in-difference strategy to examine how increases 
within states in appropriations, need-based grants, and merit-based grants 
affect student enrollment in college and their migration to other states for 
postsecondary education. We consider the impacts of these and selected 
socioeconomic and demographic factors on enrollment rates in four-year 
institutions as well as two- and four-year institutions combined, and estimate 
the effects both of dollars allocated to financial assistance and of the presence 
of broad-based merit aid programs in states.
We found that increases within states in appropriations and merit-based 
grants had positive and significant impacts on the overall college-going rates 
in states, with the dollar impact of merit-based grants being substantially 
larger than the effect of appropriations. Our findings also revealed that merit-
based grants reduced the outmigration of students for their postsecondary 
education and that both the dollar expenditures on merit aid programs and 
the introduction of a broad-based aid program had significant effects on 
access to higher education. In contrast, we found no evidence that changes 
in the level of need-based grants affected the college-going rate of students 
or their migration decisions for college.
The article is organized in four sections. First, we review the literature on 
the effects of state financial support on access to higher education and student 
migration. We then describe the panel dataset that we assembled for this study 
and the empirical strategy that we used to estimate the key parameters in 
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the models. Due to the time-series, cross-sectional nature of the dataset, we 
tested and corrected for the presence of autocorrelation in all of our models. 
Third, we present the findings for overall access to higher education, and 
in-state versus out-of-state college attendance. Finally, we conclude with a 
summary of the key findings and a discussion of the implications of these 
results and directions for future study.
LIterature revIew
A significant amount of attention has been given to explaining how stu-
dents make decisions about postsecondary education. As summarized in a 
number of literature reviews (Becker, 1990; Heller, 1997; Jackson & Weath-
ersby, 1975; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987), student demand studies often use the 
investment in human capital framework to examine how changes in the costs 
and benefits of college affect students. The variables in these studies (such 
as financial aid and family income) are selected on the basis of whether they 
may affect the costs of going to college, the benefits of going to college, or 
the preferences that students may receive from going to college. Studies typi-
cally have better data on measures relating to the cost of investing in human 
capital and the preferences of students for going to college than data on the 
financial benefits from going to college. The main interest of many of these 
studies was to measure price elasticity of demand for higher education. The 
general consensus of this literature is that the demand for higher education 
tends to be relatively inelastic, although the demand is likely more elastic 
for specific institutions. 
A subset of studies on this topic explored the factors that affect student 
migration decisions for college (Adkisson & Peach, 2008; Baryla & Dotter-
weich, 2001, 2006; Curs & Singell, 2002; Dotterweich & Baryla, 2005; Greene, 
1994; Groen & White, 2004; Kyung, 1996; Mak & Moncur, 2003; McHugh 
& Morgan, 1984; Mixon, 1992; Mixon & Hsing, 1994a, 1994b; Noorbakhsh 
& Culp, 2002; Orsuwan & Heck, 2009; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2004; Zhang, 
2007). These studies focused primarily on the impact of pricing, institutional 
reputation, and distance on students’ decision to migrate to other states for 
their postsecondary education. The migration studies focus on factors that 
may affect why students leave their particular state for their postsecondary 
education and why states or institutions would be willing to enroll them. 
Mixon’s (1992) study showed that student outmigration is higher in states 
with lower-reputation institutions, and Kyung (1996) found that demand 
for a particular out-of-state institution decreases with distance to the institu-
tion. In two empirical studies including both public and private institutions, 
Mixon and Hsing (1994a, 1994b) identified a positive relationship between 
nonresident tuition and enrollment levels. Baryla and Dotterweich (2001) 
found no overall relationship between nonresident tuition and enrollments 
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and also found that nonresident students were attracted to higher-quality 
institutions. 
Governments have traditionally been major sponsors of higher education. 
Economists attribute governmental financial support for research activities 
to the notion that basic research is essentially a “public good” for society 
and thus subsidies might be needed to help encourage its production. With 
regard to the teaching mission of postsecondary institutions, it has been 
argued that education leads to spillover benefits, or positive externalities, 
for society (Blundell, Dearden, Goodman, & Reed, 2000; Creedy & Francois, 
1990; Moretti, 2004; Paulsen, 2001; Venniker, 2000). The positive externali-
ties from higher education might include pecuniary benefits from higher 
taxes paid and contributions to the standard of living in their community 
as individuals acquire skills that are rewarded in the labor market, plus non-
pecuniary benefits such as improved civic participation and reduced crime 
rates (Dee, 2003; McMahon, 2009).1 According to the investment in human 
capital model, students take into account only their private financial benefits 
and costs, and their underlying preference for going to college, when making 
decisions about whether to acquire more education (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 
1958; Schultz, 1961). To reach the socially optimal level of enrollments for 
a region, governmental financial support for higher education is therefore 
needed to entice some students to go to college who might otherwise not 
do so by reducing their private cost of investing in human capital. This 
reduction can be accomplished by either subsidizing institutions that will 
then reduce the price they charge to residents or by giving money directly 
to students to offset tuition. 
If the state’s objective is to provide financial support to maximize positive 
externalities for the state, then the best strategy would be to design policies 
that convince more students both to go to college and also to spend some 
time in the state during and/or after their postsecondary education. For 
example, if a state is successful at helping more students go to college but 
these students move to other states following receipt of aid, then the posi-
tive externalities the students create will follow them. For this reason, states 
usually rely on in-kind aid programs so that the financial assistance must be 
used at an institution within state boundaries. This restriction applies not 
1Although we focus on the goal of maximizing positive externalities to explain state be-
havior, we acknowledge that there are other models and theories that have also been used to 
describe governmental support for higher education. The median voter model, for example, 
posits that lawmakers act in ways aimed at appeasing the average, or median, voter in their 
regions. In this model, government support for higher education mirrors the preferences of 
voters; hence, programs such as appropriations that benefit larger numbers of voters than 
need-based grants would tend to be more highly supported, according to this theory. It has 
also been argued that competing interest groups have an effect on the level and form of 
governmental support for higher education.
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only to merit-based and need-based grants but also to appropriations that 
are used to reduce the tuition rates charged to state residents. Policymakers 
hope that, if a student stays in state for college, then the state will gain positive 
externalities while the student receives an education. This approach is sup-
ported by a number of studies that have shown that students are more likely 
to live in the state following graduation (Groen, 2004; Ionescu & Polgreen, 
2009; Kodrzycki, 2001; Perry, 2001) and thus provide even greater positive 
externalities to the state in the future.
The literature on the effects of state financial support on access to and 
migration in higher education consists of studies that vary in several impor-
tant ways. First, studies differ in the unit of analysis used to investigate the 
effects of financial support on student enrollment decisions. Some studies, 
such as Kane (2003), van Der Klaauw (2002), Perna and Titus (2004), Dy-
narski (2004), Long (2004), and DesJardins and McCall (2006, 2009), used 
longitudinal data about students to determine whether the level and type of 
aid received affected the postsecondary choices of students.
This literature has been particularly important for the field of higher 
education because it provides examples of how to correct for the fact that the 
receipt of financial aid is usually endogenous and correlated with omitted/
unobservable factors that can also influence student choice. For example, 
more highly motivated students may be more likely both to receive financial 
aid and also to go to college. Unobservable factors such as motivation that may 
be positively correlated with both aid and demand could lead to an upward 
bias in estimates of the effect of aid on demand. Student-level studies such 
as those cited above attempt to correct for this problem by using a variety 
of techniques such as regression discontinuity, propensity score matching, 
instrumental variables, or natural experiments (Becker, 2003; Cellini, 2008; 
DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2006).
Other studies have used state-level data to study how changes in state 
financial support have impacted student choice (Heller, 1999; Mak & Mon-
cur, 2003; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; St. John, Chung, Musoba, & 
Simmons, 2006; Zhang & Ness, 2010). Most state-level studies relied on panel 
data research designs to expand the sample size, used fixed effects estima-
tion to remove the influence of unobservable factors that can affect student 
choice, and employed a difference-in-difference statistical approach to test 
for whether the introduction of a broad-based merit aid program led to an 
increase in student demand within a state. Broad-based merit aid programs 
are treated as natural experiments because the program represents an ex-
ogenous policy shift that affected a particular group of students (Cornwell, 
Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2002a).
A second defining feature of state aid studies is that they vary in terms 
of the type of state aid examined. It is most common for recent studies in 
this line of inquiry to focus on the effects of merit-based grants on student 
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choice (Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2000, 2004; Kane, 
2003; Mak & Moncur, 2003; St. John, Chung, Musoba, & Simmons, 2006; 
Zhang & Ness, 2010). Merit-based grants have received considerable attention 
from analysts because such programs have been adopted by 17 states since 
1993, and concerns have been raised that these programs are inefficient and 
inequitable because they divert financial support toward students who are 
already predisposed to going to college (Heller, 2006). However, as noted by 
Dynarski (2004), broad-based merit aid programs are different from other 
merit-based grants in that they seek to help a large number of students and 
are more geared toward improving access. States may also benefit from merit 
aid programs if they are successful in convincing more high-ability students 
to attend an in-state college.
Studies by Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006), Zhang and Ness (2010), 
Mak and Moncur (2003), and Dynarski (2002a), examined the impact of 
merit aid on student demand by including a dummy variable for years 
in which broad-based merit aid programs were in effect. However, other 
researchers—including Heller (1999) and St. John, Chung, Musoba, and 
Simmons (2006)—instead used the dollars of merit aid per student, which 
captured merit aid from all state sources including broad-based programs 
as well as the relative size of the grant program.
Some research focused attention on need-based financial aid (Heller, 1999; 
Perna & Titus, 2004; St. John, Chung, Musoba, & Simmons, 2006). The inter-
est among researchers in need-based aid is often justified on the grounds that 
such programs are intentionally targeted toward improving access to higher 
education for students from low-income families. Toutkoushian and Shafiq 
(2010) discussed how, in theory, need-based grants could be more effective 
than appropriations at raising the college-going rate of students if the aid 
can be targeted to only those students who would be less likely go to college 
without the aid. In contrast, the financial benefit from state appropriations 
is given to all residents who attend a public, in-state institution regardless of 
their ability to pay for college. The results from empirical studies of need-
based aid, however, have been mixed with regard to whether increases in 
need-based grants lead to higher college participation rates (Goldrick-Rab, 
Harris, & Trostel, 2009 ; Perna & Titus, 2004; St. John, Chung, Musoba, & 
Simmons, 2006).
Turning to the final form of state support for higher education—appro-
priations—there have been relatively few investigations that have examined 
their impact on access to college or student migration (Mak & Moncur, 
2003; Perna & Titus, 2004). Perna and Titus (2004) found that both state 
appropriations and need-based grants had positive effects on college atten-
dance. A few studies (Heller, 1999; St. John, Chung, Musoba, & Simmons, 
2006) did not control for appropriations but instead included in-state public 
tuition rates as an independent variable in their models. The argument in 
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tabLe 1
descrIptIve statIstIcs
Variable               Mean             Standard Deviation                Minimum                 Maximum
PctPost 55.7% 9.0% 16.3% 78.7%
PctPostI 43.3% 10.0% 7.7% 72.9%
PctPostO 12.4% 6.9% 2.9% 33.2%
PctPost4Yr 39.5% 8.3% 12.9% 58.3%
PctPost4YrI 28.1% 7.8% 3.4% 46.8%
PctPost4YrO 11.4% 6.7% 1.6% 32.6%
PctBA 24.3% 5.2% 11.1% 43.2%
PctBlack 11.9% 10.9% 0.0% 59.6%
PctHisp 9.5% 10.5% 0.6% 51.0%
MedianY $23,147 $3,708 $14,448 $33,759
Fin $2,826 $719 $1,083 $6,078
FinA $2,671 $705 $1,065 $6,075
FinN $114 $115 $0 $560
FinM $42 $94 $0 $614
PctN 4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 19.5%
PctM 1.3% 2.8% 0.0% 19.5%
BBMerit 0.158 0.365 0 1
Notes: There are 500 observations for each variable. Data are for even-numbered years 1988 and 1992 
through 2008 for the 50 states. All financial variables have been adjusted for inflation (base year = 2008). 
PctPost = percentage of students attending any postsecondary institution. PctPostI = percentage of students 
attending any in-state postsecondary institution. PctPostO = percentage of students attending any out-of-
state postsecondary institution. PctPost4Yr = percentage of students attending any four-year postsecondary 
institution. PctPost4YrI = percentage of students attending any in-state four-year postsecondary institu-
tion. PctPost4YrO = percentage of students attending any out-of-state four-year postsecondary institu-
tion. PctBA = percentage of adult population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. PctBlack = percentage 
of state population ages 18–24 who are Black. PctHisp = percentage of state population ages 18–24 who 
are Hispanic. MedianY = median household income. Fin = total state financial assistance per capita ages 
18–24 for higher education. FinA = state appropriations per capita ages 18–24. FinN = state need-based 
grants per capita ages 18–24. FinM = state merit-based grants per capita ages 18–24. PctN = percentage 
of total state funding in need-based grants. PctM = percentage of total state funding in merit-based grans. 
BBMerit = number of states with broad-based merit-aid programs. 
favor of this approach would be that this variable should, in part, capture the 
effect of appropriations because they help lower tuition rates for residents. 
However, this approach has its limitations because states and institutions 
can vary considerably in the extent to which appropriations reduce tuition 
rates. Likely many factors in addition to appropriations can affect tuition, and 
using tuition to explain enrollments raises concerns about the simultaneity 
between tuition and enrollments (Calhoun & Kamerschen, 2010). 
The empirical studies on state financial support can also be grouped ac-
cording to whether they focused on access to higher education or student 
outmigration. Because policymakers have long viewed financial support as 
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a means of enticing more students to go to college, it is not surprising that 
most attention in the literature has been paid to whether state financial sup-
port raises college enrollment rates. Studies that have exclusively examined 
access to higher education as the dependent variable of interest (Dynarski, 
2002a, 2004; Heller, 1999; Kane, 2003; St. John, Chung, Musoba, & Simmons, 
2006), while other studies (Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Perna & Titus, 
2004; Zhang & Ness, 2010) have focused on the impact of state financing on 
both access to higher education and student outmigration. 
There are, however, several important gaps in the current literature on the 
effects of state financial aid policy on students. First, no study has focused on 
comparing the relative impacts on students of all three forms of state finan-
cial support for higher education. Researchers typically treat appropriations 
as being separate from need-based and merit-based grants even though all 
three are mechanisms by which states can try to increase access and reduce 
mobility. The relative impacts of appropriations and grants—both need-
based and merit-based—on students, and whether each form has an effect on 
students holding the other two constant, should be of great interest to state 
policymakers who have to decide how to allocate their financial resources 
between them. Second, no study has examined whether the level of financial 
assistance or the presence of broad-based financial aid has the largest impact 
on student access and mobility. Researchers have traditionally examined one 
or the other but not both at the same time. Finally, much of the literature on 
state financial policy is now in need of updating. This factor is particularly 
important because several of the main studies in the field took place prior 
to the significant growth of broad-based merit-aid programs.
data and MethodoLogy
For this study, we compiled a panel dataset of information for all 50 states 
for 1988 and all even-numbered years from 1992 to 2008. The final dataset 
contained 500 observations. We relied on several sources of information to 
construct the variables used in this study. We used the Digest of Education 
Statistics produced by the National Center for Education Statistics (selected 
years) to determine the numbers of recent high school graduates who at-
tended postsecondary institutions either in their state of residence or out of 
state for the even-numbered years 1992 to 2008. Because the Digest of Edu-
cation Statistics did not include similar counts for 1988, we calculated these 
quantities by summing institutional enrollments by residency status from 
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). We obtained 
data from the U.S. Census Bureau on the median family income, population 
estimates by race/ethnicity and age, and educational attainment of adults by 
state. The Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education (WICHE) 
was the source of data we used on public and private high school graduates 
62  The Review of higheR educaTion    Fall 2012
by state and year. We relied on Grapevine (2010) for information on the an-
nual state appropriations by state for higher education. Finally, the National 
Association of State Scholarship and Grant Aid Programs (NASSGAP) was 
the source of information on state need-based and merit-based financial aid 
by year and state. (For a more complete description of the variables and data 
sources, see the Appendix.)
A number of advantages should be noted from our use of a panel dataset 
for this study. First, the panel dataset allowed us to simultaneously examine 
and control for time-series and cross-sectional changes in the college-going 
behavior of high school graduates. Second, because cross-sectional stud-
ies of state-level data are adversely affected by having too few degrees of 
freedom, the panel dataset substantially increased the sample size that we 
could use to estimate the parameters in the statistical models. Third, the 
fixed effects estimation method enabled us to control for unobservable state 
characteristics that are constant over the sample period but which impact 
on the college-going rates of students in each state. For these reasons, panel 
datasets are becoming increasingly popular in empirical studies in the field 
of higher education for conducting state-level studies. For mathematical and 
statistical details of fixed effects and random effects estimators, see Greene 
(1997) and Wooldridge (2002).
Dependent Variables
In this study, we examined six different dependent variables that all rep-
resent the college-going rates of high school graduates. In each instance, we 
constructed the variable by comparing the number of high school gradu-
ates enrolled in a certain type of institution to the number of high school 
graduates (public and private) in the year in question. The first dependent 
variable was the percentage of high school graduates from each state who 
enrolled in any public or private two-year or four-year postsecondary insti-
tution within twelve months of graduation (PctPost). The second and third 
dependent variables that we constructed were the percentages of graduating 
seniors who enrolled at a two-year or four-year institution in their home state 
(PctPostI) or in another state (PctPostO). The final three dependent variables 
(PctPost4Yr, PctPost4YrI, PctPost4YrO) were defined in similar ways to the 
first three variables, except that the numerators included only enrollments 
in four-year institutions.
Because institutions are required to submit data to the federal government 
only on how many graduating seniors stayed in-state or went out-of-state 
for college in even-numbered years, we had to restrict our analysis to even-
numbered years. Beginning in 2001, it became optional for institutions to 
report data on student migration in odd-numbered years to the National 
Center for Education Statistics. However, we found that the institutional 
response rates for odd-numbered years were substantially lower than for 
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even-numbered years and therefore believe that the college attendance 
and migration rates in odd-numbered years would be biased downward. 
For this reason, we excluded odd-numbered years from 2001 onward from 
our study. We excluded 1986—the first year for which migration data were 
collected—due to the excessive number of institutions with missing data. 
Finally, we could not include 1990 in our analysis because the NCES does 
not report enrollment data for institutions in this year.
Independent Variables
We identified a series of independent variables that the investment in hu-
man capital model and the empirical literature on higher education suggest 
could influence the college-going rates of students. The investment in human 
capital model holds that student decisions about postsecondary education 
are affected by the financial cost of going to college, the financial benefits 
of going to college, and the preferences (utility) that students receive from 
going to college. The variables that we use can be grouped into factors that 
affect cost and the preferences for college. Although we did not have data on 
measures of the financial benefit from attending college within each state, the 
fixed effects estimation would capture the net effects of benefits and other 
factors that were constant within each state over the time period of our study.
First, according to the investment in human capital model, the ability 
of students to pay for college can affect the postsecondary aspirations and 
choices of students. To capture this construct, we created a variable for the 
median household income in each state (MedianY). The median household 
income was adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (base 
year 2008). It is also possible that, through the investment in human capital 
model, some groups of students would have higher or lower preferences for 
going to college, holding constant their expected benefits and costs of college. 
Accordingly, we included variables in our models for the percentage of the 
population 25 years of age and older with a bachelor’s degree (PctBA), and 
the percentages of the population ages 18–24 that were Black (PctBlack) or 
Hispanic (PctHisp).
We also obtained data on the poverty rate of adults in each state but found 
no material differences in the results from our analyses when we replaced 
median household income with the poverty rate. To control for time fixed 





) for the even-numbered years 1992 to 2008. Similarly, we constructed a 




) to control for state fixed ef-
fects in our models.
Finally, we created several additional variables to test the main conjectures 
in this study about the impact of state financial support on student access to 
higher education and outmigration. The investment in human capital model 
predicts that increases in financial assistance would lower the private cost 
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of attending college, resulting in a greater propensity to attend college. The 
first variable represented the total state financial assistance per capita that 
was given to higher education (Fin). This variable was defined as the sum 
of state appropriations, need-based grants, and merit-based grants in each 
year, divided by the state’s population ages 18–24. Similarly, we constructed 
variables for per-capita state appropriations (FinA), per-capita state need-
based grants (FinN), and per-capita state merit-based grants (FinM). We 
expressed these metrics in per-capita dollars to standardize comparisons in 
funding across states and to provide approximate measures of financial sup-
port for college-aged residents in each state. All four state funding variables 
were adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (base year 2008).
We also created variables to represent the percentage of total state funding 
in the form of need-based grants (PctN) or merit-based grants (PctM). The 
final state finance variable used here was a dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if the state had a broad-based, merit aid grant program in the year in ques-
tion (BBMerit), and 0 otherwise.2 To examine how the form and level of state 
financial assistance affected access to higher education and state migration, 
we used fixed effects models to estimate the key parameters in the model.3 
The four alternative model specifications that we applied to each dependent 




































б + DEMitγ + λ4FinAit + λ5FinNit + λ6FinMit + λ7BBMeritit + uit
where the dependent variable Y = percentage of high school graduates in state 
i and year t enrolling in a two-year or four-year postsecondary education 
(PctPost, PctPostI, PctPostO), or only a four-year postsecondary institution 
2The following states adopted broad-based merit aid programs during the time span of 
our study: Georgia (1993), Mississippi (1995), New Mexico (1996), Florida (1997), Missouri 
(1997), Kentucky (1998), Louisiana (1998), Alaska (1999), Nevada (1999), Michigan (2000), 
South Carolina (2001), West Virginia (2002), Tennessee (2003), South Dakota (2003), Mass-
achusetts (2006), and Wyoming (2006). A 17th state, Arkansas, introduced a broad-based 
merit aid program in 2010, but we could not include this program in our analysis due to the 
date of its implementation (Bell & Anderson, 2010; Zhang & Ness, 2010).
3The fixed effects models were estimated in STATA version 10 using the XTREG command 
as follows: XTREG Y X, FE VCE(CLUSTER, STATE_ID), where Y = dependent variable, X = 
set of independent variables (including dummy variables for time), FE = fixed effects estima-
tor, and VCE(CLUSTER, STATE_ID) = use White’s (1984) procedure to obtain consistent 
standard errors to correct for autocorrelation.
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(PctPost4Yr, PctPost4YrI, PctPost4YrO), S
i
 = state indicator variables with 
fixed effects α, T
t
 = time indicator variables with fixed effects β, SES
it
 = set 
of socioeconomic control variables (MedianY, PctBA) with coefficients δ, 
DEM
it





 = effects of alternative measures of state financial support 
for higher education on the college-going rate or migration rate, and u = 
random error term.
Several studies in the literature have included public tuition rates as an 
independent variable in the analysis. Although price seems to be an obvious 
choice for an explanatory variable in this type of model, we opted to exclude 
tuition for several reasons. First, because economic models often treat “price” 
and “quantity” as being determined simultaneously, the inclusion of tuition 
on the right-hand side of equations (1) through (4) would be inappropri-
ate. Second, the in-state tuition rates at public institutions are, almost by 
definition, negatively correlated with the level of state appropriations, as 
legislatures provide funding to public institutions in part to reduce tuition 
rates for state residents. Accordingly, controlling for tuition and appropria-
tions would not allow us to capture the total impact of appropriations on 
student enrollment. Finally, tuition rates may also be correlated with other 
forms of state financial assistance. Because the models control for state fixed 
effects, the coefficients on the other variables in the model are interpreted 
as the effects of changes in the variables within states on the postsecondary 
decisions of students.
The four models differ in how we tested for the impacts of state financial 
support on student postsecondary decisions. In Model 1, we controlled for 
the per-capita level of total financial support and the percentages of funding 
in the form of need-based and merit-based grants. This model allows us to 
focus on changes in the level of total funding within states and on the rela-
tive mix of funding given to need- and merit-based grants. Model 2 was the 
same as Model 1, except that we dropped the two variables for percentage 
funding and replaced the total state funding variable with the three per-capita 
funding variables for appropriations, need-based grants, and merit-based 
grants. Doing so allowed us to directly compare the impacts of incremental 
per-student dollar increases in each type of funding on student decisions 
about postsecondary education.
Models 3 and 4 used a difference-in-difference approach to determine 
whether the introduction of a broad-based merit aid program affected the 
college-going behavior of students. Model 3 was the same as Model 1 except 
that we replaced the percentage funding variables with a dummy variable 
for whether the state had a broad-based, merit aid program in place. The 
model enables us to determine if, holding constant the level of total financial 
support for higher education in a state, whether the introduction of a broad-
66  The Review of higheR educaTion    Fall 2012
based merit-aid program led to changes in student postsecondary decisions. 
Finally, in Model 4 we added the dummy variable for broad-based merit aid 
programs to Model 2 to determine if increases in the size of a state’s total 
merit aid programs, as measured by dollars per capita, had a significant 
effect on students after taking into account the creation of a broad-based 
merit aid program.4 In all four models, the state-level fixed effects allowed 
us to capture the net impact of other factors that would also be thought to 
impact access or migration but which could not be measured and/or were 
constant within each state over the sample period.
Due to the time-series nature of the data, it was likely that the results 
from the fixed effects models would be affected by autocorrelation. Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) assert that the standard errors in panel data 
studies can be biased downward due to autocorrelation, and that the vast 
majority of panel data studies they reviewed did not attempt to correct for 
this problem. To test for autocorrelation, we relied on the procedure devel-
oped by Wooldridge (2002) and summarized by Drukker (2003) for panel 
data. The test for autocorrelation was conducted by first-differencing all of 
the variables, regressing the first difference in Y against the first differences 
of the explanatory variables in the model, and then regressing the residuals 
from the first-difference model against their lagged values to determine if 
the coefficient was statistically different from -0.50. In all instances, we were 
able to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation (p < .01), and thus 
concluded that adjustments needed to be made for autocorrelation. We then 
corrected for autocorrelation by obtaining consistent standard error estimates 
using a procedure originally developed by White (1984). We implemented 
the procedure in STATA using the cluster command option for the fixed 
effects model. In simulations, Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) 
found that this approach was the most effective at properly adjusting the 
standard errors in panel data.5
4We also estimated several other model specifications that are not shown in this article. 
The first alternative model added the variable for the presence of broad-based merit aid 
programs to Model (1). The second alternative model was a variant of Model (2) where we 
dropped the variable FinM and added the dummy variable BBMerit. The results from these 
model variations were very similar to those shown in this study.
5The procedure recommended by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) is to obtain 
asymptotically consistent standard error estimates through the variance-covariance matrix 
in the model. This procedure is an extension of the approach developed by White (1984) to 
address heteroscedasticity in cross-sectional studies when the form of heteroscedasticity is 
unknown. We made the corrections in STATA by using the cluster command and identify-
ing the states as the clusters of interest. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) showed 
that this approach produced more reliable results than attempts to parametrically estimate 
the degree of autocorrelation within panels. More details on the alternatives for correcting 
autocorrelation in panel data can be found in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
TouTkoushian & hillman / State Appropriations and Grants 67
Drawing on theory and empirical studies, we anticipated a number of find-
ings across the various models. Beginning with the socioeconomic status of 
a state, a sizable literature has shown that students from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds have lower levels of educational attainment than their peers 
from higher socioeconomic backgrounds (Alexander, Pallas, & Holupka, 
1987; Blau & Duncan, 1967; Hearn, 1984; Hossler, Schmit, & Vesper, 1999; 
Hout, Raftery, & Bell, 1993; McDonough, 1997; Walpole, 2003). Accord-
ingly, we posited that gains in a state’s socioeconomic status, as measured 
by MedianY and PctBA, would have a direct effect on the demand for higher 
education. With regard to race/ethnicity, many studies have examined the 
connections between race/ethnicity and educational attainment (Dynarski, 
2002b; Hurtado, Inkelas, Briggs, & Rhee, 1997; Jackson, 1990; Kane, 1994; 
Kane & Spizman, 1994; Morgan, 1996; Perna, 2000; Rivkin, 1995; Roscigno, 
1998, 1999, 2000; St. John & Noell, 1989). Although descriptive statistics have 
shown that college participation rates are lower for Blacks and Hispanics 
relative to Whites, Perna (2000) notes: “The extent to which college enroll-
ment behaviors vary across racial/ethnic groups after controlling for other 
variables is equivocal” (p. 120). Therefore, it is not clear a priori whether 
changes in the percentages of Blacks and Hispanics in a state would lead to 
changes in the college enrollment rates or migration of students.
Turning to the state financial support variables, if raising the overall level 
of state financial assistance for higher education within a state (Fin) is helpful 
at increasing the state’s college-going rate, then we should find that it has a 
positive effect (λ
1
 > 0) on overall college participation. The separate effects 
of changes in appropriations, need-based grants, and merit-based grants in 
states on access and migration, however, may vary in sign and strength across 
the various models. Because appropriations cannot be used at institutions 
outside of the state’s boundaries, it is reasonable to expect that they will be 
more likely to increase the percentage of students going to an in-state col-
lege and reduce the percentage of students going out-of-state. The effect of 
need-based grants on access to higher education, however, is also likely to 
be influenced by factors such as the portability of aid, the size of the typical 
award relative to in-state tuition, and the income threshold used for deter-
mining aid eligibility. 
With regard to merit-based grants, if the state dollars are primarily given to 
students who would likely attend college without the aid, then conventional 
wisdom holds that their impact on the overall college-going rates should be 
smaller than need-based grants. The effect of merit aid on access to higher 
education may also depend on factors such as the size of financial awards, 
the level of academic performance needed to qualify for the grant, and the 
institutions where the merit aid can be applied to tuition and fees. And as 
suggested by Dynarski (2004), if students increase their academic perfor-
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mance to qualify for broad-based merit aid, then these programs could lead 
to increases in overall college enrollment rates.
Finally, it is possible that the findings from the models would differ de-
pending on whether the dependent variable includes enrollments in only 
four-year institutions or in all postsecondary institutions (Rouse, 1994). 
Four-year institutions typically charge higher tuition rates than their two-year 
counterparts, and thus a subsidy that covers the same percentage of tuition 
would have a larger dollar reduction for students attending four-year versus 
two-year institutions. Appropriations per capita are likely to vary across 
institutions within states, thus leading to further differences in impacts on 
students. Likewise, merit-based and need-based grants may have different 
restrictions on whether the aid can be used at two-year institutions. We an-
ticipated few differences in the results for out-of-state four-year institutions 
and all institutions because most students who migrate to other states for 
postsecondary education enroll in four-year institutions. 
resuLts
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
study when the data are pooled across states and years. Beginning with the 
six dependent variables, the results show that the average percentage of high 
school graduates going to any two-year or four-year institution was 55.7%, 
while slightly less than 40% of all students attended a four-year institution. 
Roughly four-fifths of all college students, and 71% of students attending 
four-year institutions, opted to attend institutions in their home state. The 
vast majority of students who migrated to other states for their postsecond-
ary education attended four-year institutions. Each of these six measures 
of college attendance exhibited substantial variation across states and time.
The descriptive statistics for the socioeconomic measures PctBA and 
MedianY and the demographic factors PctBlack and PctHisp also showed 
considerable differences across the states and/or time. The state funding 
measures revealed that the average amount of financial assistance per capita 
from all sources was $2,826 (in 2008 dollars), which represented slightly more 
than half of the average price of attending an in-state flagship institution. Not 
surprisingly, the vast majority of state financial assistance was in the form of 
appropriations to designated public institutions. Not only were the average 
per capita grant figures small in absolute terms, but the maximum values 
within the period under examination would cover only a small fraction of 
the price of attendance at in-state public institutions.
Table 2 shows what happened to the average college-going rate and the 
state migration rate during the 1988–2008 period. The data revealed that the 
overall college participation rates of graduating high school seniors rose by 
18 percentage points over this 20-year period, with about one-third of the 
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tabLe 2
trends In average coLLege-goIng rates and  
state MIgratIon, 1988–2008
Year  All Postsecondary Institutions   Four-Year Postsecondary Institutions 
                PctPost        PctPostI        PctPostO      PctPost4Yr         PctPost4YrI        PctPost4YrO
1988 44.3% 35.3% 9.1% 30.7% 22.7% 8.0%
1992 52.5% 40.7% 11.8% 36.7% 26.0% 10.7%
1994 55.2% 42.6% 12.7% 38.9% 27.3% 11.6%
1996 56.7% 43.5% 13.2% 40.2% 28.2% 12.0%
1998 56.8% 43.8% 13.0% 40.5% 28.5% 12.0%
2000 56.7% 43.6% 13.1% 40.7% 28.7% 12.1%
2002 55.9% 43.3% 12.6% 40.2% 28.7% 11.6%
2004 56.1% 44.0% 12.1% 39.8% 28.7% 11.1%
2006 61.2% 47.6% 13.6% 43.5% 31.0% 12.5%
2008 62.1% 48.8% 13.3% 43.5% 31.3% 12.3%
Notes: There are 500 observations for each variable. PctPost = percentage of graduating high school se-
niors attending any two-year or four-year postsecondary institution. PctPostI = percentage of graduating 
high school seniors attending any in-state two-year or four-year postsecondary institution. PctPostO = 
percentage of graduating high school seniors attending any out-of-state two-year or four-year postsec-
ondary institution. PctPost4Yr = percentage of graduating high school seniors attending any four-year 
postsecondary institution. PctPost4YrI = percentage of graduating high school seniors attending any 
in-state four-year postsecondary institution. PctPost4YrO = percentage of graduating high school seniors 
attending any out-of-state four-year postsecondary institution. High school seniors include public and 
private schools during the previous 12 months. 
tabLe 3
trends In state FInancIaL assIstance  
For hIgher educatIon, 1988-2008
Year           Fin           FinA           FinN        FinM           PctN          PctM          BBMerit
1988 $2,640 $2,558 $73 $9 2.9% 0.3% 0
1992 $2,642 $2,549 $82 $11 3.3% 0.4% 0
1994 $2,713 $2,597 $98 $19 3.7% 0.7% 1
1996 $2,775 $2,653 $101 $20 3.7% 0.7% 3
1998 $2,909 $2,768 $113 $29 3.9% 1.0% 7
2000 $2,940 $2,779 $117 $43 4.0% 1.4% 10
2002 $2,803 $2,617 $123 $63 4.5% 2.1% 12
2004 $2,776 $2,577 $133 $66 5.0% 2.1% 14
2006 $3,040 $2,819 $145 $76 5.2% 2.2% 16
2008 $3,023 $2,789 $155 $80 5.6% 2.4% 16
Notes: There are 500 observations for each variable. Fin = total state financial assistance per capita ages 
18–24 for higher education. FinA = state appropriations per capita ages 18–24. FinN = state need-based 
grants per capita ages 18–24. FinM = state merit-based grants per capita ages 18–24. PctN = percentage 
of total state funding in need-based grants. PctM = percentage of total state funding in merit-based grans. 
BBMerit = number of states with broad-based merit-aid programs. All financial variables are adjusted 
for inflation (2008 dollars).
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tabLe 4
correLatIons oF seLected varIabLes, 1988–2008
Variable       PctPost       PctPostI       PctPostO       PctPost4Yr       PctPost4YrI       PctPost4YrO
Fin 0.19 0.24 -0.10 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09
FinA 0.12 0.18 -0.10 -0.16 -0.08 -0.11
FinN 0.30 0.14 0.19 0.35 0.18 0.23
FinM 0.19 0.30 -0.19 0.15 0.31 -0.18
PctN 0.24 0.04 0.26 0.37 0.14 0.29
PctM 0.17 0.29 -0.20 0.15 0.32 -0.19
BBMerit 0.16 0.25 -0.15 0.07 0.20 -0.15
Notes: There are 500 observations for each variable. PctPost = percentage of students attending any post-
secondary institution. PctPostI = percentage of students attending any in-state postsecondary institution. 
PctPostO = percentage of students attending any out-of-state postsecondary institution. PctPost4Yr = 
percentage of students attending any four-year postsecondary institution. PctPost4YrI = percentage of 
students attending any in-state four-year postsecondary institution. PctPost4YrO = percentage of students 
attending any out-of-state four-year postsecondary institution. Fin = total state financial assistance per 
capita for higher education. FinA = state appropriations per capita. FinN = state need-based grants per 
capita. FinM = state merit-based grants per capita. PctN = percentage of total state financial assistance in 
the form of need-based grants. PctM = percentage of total state financial assistance in the form of merit-
based grants. BBMerit = 1 if the state had a broad-based merit aid program for the year in question, 0 
otherwise. All correlations of ±0.06 or higher were statistically significant at the 5% level.
gain coming in the last five years. The increase in four-year college participa-
tion rates was also substantial but smaller for this period, with rates rising 
from 30.7% in 1988 to 43.5% in 2008. Interestingly, most of the increase in 
student outmigration occurred prior to the time when many states adopted 
broad-based merit aid programs.
In Table 3, the first three columns contain data on the average levels of state 
financial assistance per capita by form (appropriations, need-based grants, 
merit-based grants) and year. All figures are in constant (2008) dollars per 
capita ages 18–24 and are averaged across states. The next two columns in the 
table show the percentages of total state funding that were made for need-
based grants and merit-based grants, respectively. Finally, the last column 
reports the number of states in each year that had a broad-based merit aid 
grant program.
It can be seen in Table 3 that total state financial support per capita for 
higher education and appropriations per capita increased slightly over this 
time period even after adjusting for inflation. Alternatively, state grants 
(both need-based and merit-based) rose at a faster pace than appropria-
tions throughout the 20-year period that we considered. Nonetheless, the 
level of per-capita funding for state grants remained fairly small overall in 
comparison to appropriations, with about 8% of total state support in 2008 






















FIxed eFFects ModeLs expLaInIng percentage oF students goIng to coLLege, 1988 to 2008
Variable                 Attend Any Postsecondary Institution (Y=PctPost)                               Attend Four-Year Postsecondary Institution (Y=PctPost4Yr) 
               Model 1           Model 2           Model 3            Model 4                                Model 1            Model 2            Model 3            Model 4
MedianY -7.349 -7.868 -10.298 -9.877 -15.947 -15.452 -17.576 -16.546
  (20.723) (20.758) (19.901) (19.919) (14.387) (14.546) (13.912) (14.111)
PctBA 0.249* 0.249* 0.294* 0.293* 0.181 0.180 0.206* 0.204*
  (0.121) (0.121) (0.124) (0.125) (0.094) (0.094) (0.089) (0.089)
PctBlack -0.089 -0.087 -0.092 -0.092 -0.070 -0.070 -0.072 -0.073
  (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
PctHisp -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
  (0.135) (0.135) (0.131) (0.130) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.115)
Fin 2.134* — 1.789* — 0.779 — 0.586 —
  (0.875)   (0.880)   (0.452)   (0.474)  
FinA — 1.981* — 1.615 — 0.576 — 0.377
    (0.890)   (0.897)   (0.431)   (0.457)
FinN — -0.832 — 1.504 — 2.448 — 3.721
    (8.815)   (8.886)   (4.477)   (4.684)
FinM — 14.452** — 8.003 — 6.542* — 3.031
    (3.882)   (4.655)   (2.925)   (3.530)
PctN -0.078 — -0.004 — 0.036 — 0.077 —
  (0.284)   (0.280)   (0.142)   (0.145)  
PctM 0.398** — 0.168 — 0.176 — 0.049 —
  (0.131)   (0.171)   (0.096)   (0.114)  
BBMerit — — 3.345 3.267* — — 1.848 1.778
      (1.664) (1.608)     (1.361) (1.328)
R-Squared 0.512 0.513 0.521 0.521 0.506 0.561 0.566 0.566
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Table 4 shows how the state financial variables under consideration in our 
study were correlated with the six measures of college attendance. As in Table 
1, the data were pooled across states and years. All correlations of ±0.06 or 
higher were statistically significant at the 5% significance level. We found 
that all of the measures of state financial support were positively correlated 
with the overall college-going rate and the percentages of students staying 
in-state for college. The data showed that appropriations and merit-based 
grants were negatively correlated with the percentage of students migrating 
to other states. At the same time, need-based grants were positively correlated 
with outmigration. The same general patterns held true when we considered 
attendance in only four-year institutions, except that appropriations were 
found to be negatively correlated with the percentage of students attending 
any four-year institution or staying in-state for college.
Although the findings in Tables 1–4 are interesting, they are limited in 
two respects. First, the univariate statistics do not take into account the ef-
fects of other factors on access to postsecondary education and migration 
across state lines. Second, because the data were pooled across states, the 
figures ignore the panel nature of the dataset. Accordingly, Tables 5 through 
7 contain the main results from the fixed effects models that we estimated. 
In Table 5, we estimated Models 1–4 for the two measures of overall college 
attendance (PctPost and PctPost4Yr). This approach was repeated for the two 
measures of in-state college attendance (PctPostI and PctPost4YrI) in Table 
6, and we likewise applied the equations to out-of-state migration (PctPostO 
and PctPost4YrO) in Table 7. In all three tables, the results were corrected for 
first-order serial correlation as described in the previous section.
Starting with Table 5, the findings showed that, after taking into account 
the other variables in the model and the panel nature of the dataset, increases 
in the educational attainment of adults within states led to gains in the per-
centage of students going to college. We did not find a similar relationship 
Notes: All models also include nine dummy variables for year and fixed effects for state. Sample size = 
500 for all models. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and were corrected for autocorrelation us-
ing White’s (1984) procedure. PctPost = percentage of students attending any postsecondary institution. 
PctPost4Yr = percentage of students attending any four-year postsecondary institution. MedianY = median 
household income. PctBA = percentage of adult population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. PctBlack 
= percentage of state population ages 18–24 who are Black. PctHisp = percentage of state population 
ages 18–24 who are Hispanic. Fin = total state financial assistance per capita for higher education. FinA 
= state appropriations per capita. FinN = state need-based grants per capita. FinM = state merit-based 
grants per capita. PctN = percentage of total state financial assistance in the form of need-based grants. 
PctM = percentage of total state financial assistance in the form of merit-based grants. BBMerit = dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the state had a broad-based merit aid program in the year in question, 0 otherwise. 























FIxed eFFects ModeLs expLaInIng percentage oF students stayIng  
In-state For coLLege, 1988 to 2008
Variable                 Attend Any Postsecondary Institution (Y=PctPostI)                            Attend Four-Year Postsecondary Institution (Y=PctPost4YrI) 
               Model 1           Model 2           Model 3            Model 4                                Model 1            Model 2            Model 3            Model 4
MedianY 8.477 7.508 5.051 5.103 0.463 0.498 -1.545 -0.919
  (20.930) (21.052) (19.668) (19.717) (14.487) (14.695) (13.663) (13.828)
PctBA 0.112 0.111 0.164 0.164 0.065 0.064 0.096 0.095
  (0.130) (0.129) (0.138) (0.138) (0.112) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109)
PctBlack -0.015 -0.012 -0.019 -0.018 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
  (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
PctHisp -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.011
  (0.143) (0.142) (0.138) (0.137) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122)
Fin 2.588** — 2.181* — 1.204** — 0.966* —
  (0.834)   (0.847)   (0.400)   (0.412)  
FinA — 2.431** — 1.993* — 1.008* — 0.750
    (0.877)   (0.891)   (0.403)   (0.406)
FinN — -0.266 — 2.532 — 2.212 — 3.860
    (8.893)   (8.976)   (4.536)   (4.699)
FinM — 17.286** — 9.564 — 9.831** — 5.282
    (4.358)   (5.077)   (3.148)   (3.813)
PctN -0.061 — 0.026 — 0.024 — 0.075 —
  (0.295)   (0.290)   (0.149)   (0.150)  
PctM 0.500** — 0.233 — 0.289* — 0.132 —
  (0.145)   (0.182)   (0.110)   (0.134)  
BBMerit — — 3.887* 3.911* — — 2.277 2.304
      (1.738) (1.675)     (1.467) (1.411)
R-Squared 0.407 0.407 0.423 0.423 0.413 0.413 0.426 0.427
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for changes in median household income within states. For race/ethnicity, we 
found no connection between changes in the percentage of Blacks or Hispan-
ics ages 18–24 within states and the percentage of students going to college.
With regard to state financial support for higher education, the data 
showed that, as states increased their investments in postsecondary education, 
more students went to college. For example, the coefficient for the variable 
Fin in Model 1 indicates that, for each additional $1,000 per capita a state 
invested in higher education, the proportion of students going to college rose 
by approximately 2.1 percentage points. The results for Model 1 in column 
5, however, were not significantly associated with attendance patterns in 
four-year institutions. 
When we broke down total per-capita state financial support into its three 
main components (Model 2), we found that increases within states in both 
appropriations and merit-based grants had positive and significant effects on 
the overall college-going rates. The point estimate of the effect of increases 
in per-capita merit-based grants was substantially greater than that for ap-
propriations. For example, the coefficients in Model 2 suggest that a $1,000 
increase in a state’s per-capita merit-based grants would lead to an increase 
of 14.5 percentage points in overall college attendance rates and an increase 
of 6.5 percentage point in four-year college attendance rates for that state. A 
similar picture emerged when we looked at the percentage of state funding 
allocated toward grants (Model 1), except that changes in the percentage of 
state aid in the form of merit-based grants was not statistically significant for 
four-year institutions. In contrast, across all models we found no evidence 
of an association between increases in need-based grants within states and 
college attendance.
Taken together, the results suggest that, when states divert appropriations 
toward merit-based grants, but not need-based grants, it would lead to gains 
in the college-going rates of graduating high school seniors. We found that 
Notes: All models also include nine dummy variables for year and fixed effects for state. Sample size = 
500 for all models. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and were corrected for autocorrelation us-
ing White’s (1984) procedure. PctPost = percentage of students attending any postsecondary institution. 
PctPost4Yr = percentage of students attending any four-year postsecondary institution. MedianY = median 
household income. PctBA = percentage of adult population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. PctBlack 
= percentage of state population ages 18–24 who are Black. PctHisp = percentage of state population 
ages 18–24 who are Hispanic. Fin = total state financial assistance per capita for higher education. FinA 
= state appropriations per capita. FinN = state need-based grants per capita. FinM = state merit-based 
grants per capita. PctN = percentage of total state financial assistance in the form of need-based grants. 
PctM = percentage of total state financial assistance in the form of merit-based grants. BBMerit = dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the state had a broad-based merit aid program in the year in question, 0 otherwise. 
** p < .01, * p < .05. 
Table 6, cont.
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the effect of this reallocation was smaller when we considered only attendance 
at four-year institutions. The evidence was mixed with regard to whether 
the creation of broad-based merit aid programs led to increases in college 
attendance. The estimated coefficient was statistically significant in only one 
of the four models at p < 0.05. 
In Table 6, we repeated the analysis except that the dependent variables 
were the percentages of students who chose to attend any in-state institution 
or any four-year in-state institution. The results for in-state college attendance 
by and large mirrored what we found for overall college attendance, which is 
not surprising given that the vast majority of college-bound students attended 
in-state institutions. Neither increases in the median household income nor 
the educational attainment level of adults within states had significant ef-
fects on the percentage of graduating high school seniors who attended an 
in-state institution. Increases in the percentage of Blacks and Hispanics in a 
state led to no significant changes in the in-state college attendance rate for 
both four-year institutions and all institutions.
The results for state financial support of higher education revealed that 
changes in total per-capita funding, appropriations per capita, and merit-
based per-capita grants within states all had positive and statistically sig-
nificant effects on the percentage of graduating seniors choosing to attend 
an institution in their state of residence. The estimated impact of states 
increasing their merit-based grants was again substantially larger than the 
impact of appropriations. Across all of the models, we found no evidence 
that increases in need-based grants within states had an impact on the 
percentage of students staying in-state for college. Both the introduction 
of a broad-based merit aid program and the per-capita dollars allocated to 
merit aid had positive and significant effects on the percentage of students 
attending any in-state institution.
Finally, in Table 7 we focused on the impact of state higher education 
financing on student outmigration. Beginning with the socioeconomic 
measures, the data showed that increases in the percentage of adults with a 
bachelor’s degree within states had a positive and significant effect on the 
percentage of high school graduates choosing to go out-of-state for college. 
We also found that outmigration fell as the median household income within 
states increased. This somewhat counterintuitive result is attributed to the 
fact that, in the fixed effects model, the impact of differences in median 
household income across states is removed from the coefficient estimate.
A one-way analysis of variance demonstrated that there was statistically 
significant variation in average household incomes across states. As another 
test, we reestimated the four models shown in Table 7 without controlling 
for state-level fixed effects and found that median family income had a 

























FIxed eFFects ModeLs expLaInIng percentage oF students goIng out-oF-state  
For coLLege, 1988 to 2008
Variable                 Attend Any Postsecondary Institution (Y=PctPostO)                           Attend Four-Year Postsecondary Institution (Y=PctPost4YrO) 
               Model 1           Model 2           Model 3            Model 4                                Model 1            Model 2            Model 3            Model 4
MedianY -15.826** -15.376* -15.348* -14.980* -16.410** -15.950** -16.031** -15.627**
  (5.719) (5.806) (5.741) (5.708) (5.509) (5.619) (5.510) (5.493)
PctBA 0.137* 0.138* 0.130* 0.129* 0.116* 0.116* 0.110 0.109
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.059)
PctBlack -0.074** -0.075** -0.073** -0.074** -0.071** -0.072** -0.070** -0.071**
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
PctHisp -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Fin -0.449* — -0.393 — -0.425* — -0.380 —
  (0.215)   (0.213)   (0.207)   (0.206)  
FinA — -0.450 — -0.378 — -0.432 — -0.373
    (0.230)   (0.226)   (0.227)   (0.223)
FinN — -0.567 — -1.028 — 0.236 — -0.140
    (1.880)   (1.923)   (1.858)   (1.890)
FinM — -2.833* — -1.560 — -3.288* — -2.251
    (1.253)   (1.591)   (1.243)   (1.605)
PctN -0.018 — -0.030 — 0.012 — 0.002 —
  (0.065)   (0.066)   (0.061)   (0.062)  
PctM -0.102* — -0.065 — -0.113** — -0.083 —
  (0.041)   (0.053)   (0.038)   (0.050)  
BBMerit — — -0.542 -0.645 — — -0.429 -0.525
      (0.544) (0.531)     (0.471) (0.467)
R-Squared 0.524 0.521 0.527 0.526 0.543 0.547 0.551 0.550
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state for college. The percentage of students migrating to other states fell 
as the percentages of the population ages 18–24 that were Black increased 
within states. Turning to the state financial variables, as the total per-capita 
financial support for higher education increased within states, students were 
less likely to go out of state for college. This relationship, however, was due 
solely to the rise in merit-based grants within states (Models 1 and 2). The 
introduction of a broad-based merit aid program in a state did not by itself 
lead to a decline in outmigration.
suMMary
The manner in which states provide financial support for higher education 
is an important topic for policymakers who seek to use finances to increase 
the number of students who obtain a college education, stay in-state, and in 
turn improve the quality of life in the region. Even though several options 
could be used to reach these goals, the majority of research studies on this 
topic have focused solely on need-based or merit-based grants. To address 
this issue, we examined the effects of all three forms of state financial sup-
port on access to higher education and the retention of students in-state. The 
panel data approach that we implemented here allowed us to use state-level 
data to more precisely model the effects of changes in aid and other factors 
within states on the percentage of students who go on to college than would 
be possible using only cross-sectional or time-series data. The fixed effects 
approach also enabled us to control for the net effect of unobservable and 
constant state-level factors that influence demand for higher education. 
Our results showed that increases in the overall level of state financial 
support within states had a positive and significant impact on access to 
higher education and on reducing migration across state lines. Raising ap-
propriations within states was effective at enticing more state residents to go 
Notes: All models also include nine dummy variables for the year and fixed effects for the state. Sample 
size = 500 for all models. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and were corrected for autocor-
relation using White’s (1984) procedure. PctPost = percentage of students attending any postsecondary 
institution. PctPost4Yr = percentage of students attending any four-year postsecondary institution. 
MedianY = median household income. PctBA = percentage of adult population with a bachelor’s degree 
or higher. PctBlack = percentage of state population ages 18–24 who are Black. PctHisp = percentage of 
state population ages 18–24 who are Hispanic. Fin = total state financial assistance per capita for higher 
education. FinA = state appropriations per capita. FinN = state need-based grants per capita. FinM = 
state merit-based grants per capita. PctN = percentage of total state financial assistance in the form of 
need-based grants. PctM = percentage of total state financial assistance in the form of merit-based grants. 
BBMerit = dummy variable equal to 1 if the state had a broad-based merit aid program in the year in 
question, 0 otherwise. ** p < .01, * p < .05.
Table 7, cont.
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to college. Increases in merit-based grants within states were shown to have 
even larger effects than appropriations on improving the college-going rate 
in states, and they also reduced student migration. These findings were, by 
and large, consistent with the literature on state financial aid, although no 
study we have found compared the dollar impacts of merit-based grants to 
state appropriations.
In contrast, we found no evidence that increases in funding for need-
based grants within states led either to gains in the college-going rates of 
students or to reduced outmigration. This result is markedly different from 
the results that St. John et al. (2006) found in their study but is in line with 
the mixed consensus from research on need-based grants. One limitation 
of state-level analyses such as ours for examining the effects of need-based 
aid is that most of the large need-based grant programs such as New York’s 
Tuition Assistance Program (1961), the Pennsylvania State Grant Program 
(1966), and the Washington State Need Grant Program (1970), were cre-
ated prior to the first year of our analysis. As a result, it is possible that the 
introduction of these programs led to gains in college participation in earlier 
years and that these effects are now incorporated into the overall state ef-
fect. Nonetheless, our findings demonstrate that, during the past 20 years, 
when states increased their levels of need-based aid, they did not translate 
into further gains in access to higher education or reductions in out-of-state 
migration for college.
Taken together, the results should give state policymakers reason to con-
sider moving away from the traditional high appropriations/low aid approach 
to financing to make higher education more accessible to residents. The fact 
that merit-based grants have substantially greater impacts than appropria-
tions shows that policymakers should explore the use of broad-based merit 
aid programs as a way to improve access to higher education. At the same 
time, increasing appropriations within states can lead to gains in the college-
going rates of students.
LIMItatIons and dIrectIons For Further research
The results from this study add to the growing body of literature showing 
that broad-based merit aid programs deserve more attention and study. To 
some extent, these programs have been unfairly compared to other merit aid 
programs that target relatively few awards to students of very high academic 
ability and achievement. In reality, both broad-based merit aid programs 
and need-based grants are intended to make it possible for large numbers 
of students to receive a financial incentive to entice them to go to college. 
As noted by Delaney and Ness (2010), however, there are wide variations in 
the design aspects of broad-based merit aid programs. Virtually no research 
has been conducted to determine how factors such as the size of the grant, 
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the portability of the grant, the level of academic performance needed to 
receive the grant, and other factors influence the postsecondary decisions 
of high school students. Given the fact that, on average, broad-based merit 
aid program have large effects on students, it would be important to know 
exactly how different aspects of these programs translate into efficiency and 
equity gains for states. More research is also needed to determine whether 
these programs actually lead students to invest more time and effort in their 
schooling with the goal of raising their academic performance and earning a 
grant. However, national analyses may be unable to fully explore the unique 
characteristics of state-specific aid program design. Accordingly, state case 
studies could examine the extent to which changes in program design may 
impact enrollment, interstate migration, or other policy objectives.
We recognize that state policymakers may have competing goals for need- 
or merit-aid programs. Some may view aid as a tool for increasing participa-
tion for underrepresented students while others view aid as a mechanism for 
raising academic standards (Ehrenberg, Zhang, & Levin, 2006), enhancing 
economic growth, or reducing income inequality. However, we posit that 
some goals are consistent with one another, namely, providing aid to increase 
positive externalities within a state. Due to data limitations, we were unable 
to disaggregate enrollment or interstate migration levels by students’ racial/
ethnic characteristics or their socioeconomic status. Similarly, we were unable 
to control for statewide Advanced Placement (AP) scores, AP participation 
rates, or other measures of academic performance due to data unavailability. 
In St. John, Chung, Musoba, and Simmons’s (2006) research, statewide high 
school academic variables failed to yield significant or positive relationships 
with college enrollment levels, suggesting that these controls may have ac-
counted for little variation in our model. Further research could examine 
how the design of aid programs impacts alternative policy goals. 
Studies in the literature have also been hampered by lack of data on key fac-
tors that theory would suggest may impact student postsecondary decisions. 
Despite the theoretical connection between benefits from going to college 
and the decision to invest in higher education, studies of student demand for 
higher education rarely use good measures of financial benefits from going 
to college. Other factors that can affect the private cost of investing in hu-
man capital, such as financial support from institutions, private sources, and 
other governmental levels, are equally difficult to obtain at the state level and 
thus are not incorporated into these studies. More work needs to be done to 
measure these factors and determine if and how they affect the findings in 
these models. The problem may require the use of different research designs, 
such as student-level and institutional-level studies or investigations of fewer 
states where such information can be obtained.
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dIscussIon and concLusIon
It is imperative that policymakers and educators begin to take a different 
look at the various approaches that states can be used to financially sup-
port higher education. Arguments over the “best” approach to financing 
can quickly become very ideological and political (Doyle, 2007b; Dynarski, 
2002b; Ehrenberg, Zhang, & Levin, 2006; Heller & Marin, 2002; St. John, 
Chung, Musoba, & Simmons, 2006). For a variety of reasons, discussions 
of state policy tend to be driven by advocates for each of the three forms of 
financial assistance. Many college administrators, for example, like the fact 
that appropriations are a stable source of revenue that they can use to help 
meet their goals and objectives and would be concerned that need-based 
and merit-based grant programs might replace some of this revenue source.
Policymakers may not appreciate the fact that these options can be viewed 
as three different approaches to essentially the same problem: how to use 
scarce funds to generate positive externalities for the state. The argument for 
state appropriations is that this goal is best accomplished by making tuition 
at public institutions within state boundaries as low as possible. In this way, 
students and their families will not be dissuaded from pursuing college be-
cause they think it is unaffordable (Johnstone, 2005). In addition, the lower 
in-state tuition reduces the relative price of attending an in-state institution, 
making it more favorable for all residents to stay in-state for college. Propo-
nents of need-based financial aid counter that the best way to increase the 
college-going rate (and generate positive externalities) is to direct funding 
to those who are least likely to be able to afford to go to college without 
financial assistance. Finally, merit aid advocates contend that incentives are 
needed to not only encourage qualified students to go to college, but also to 
help students work harder in high school (and thus become qualified to go 
to college) and to reduce the migration of high-ability students. 
Discussions about which form of aid is “best” should also recognize the 
different goals and objectives of the agencies that provide the funding. Post-
secondary education is a highly subsidized enterprise, with financial support 
coming from the federal government, state governments, private foundations 
such as the Gates Foundation, and individual donors. Each of these entities 
can be thought of as providing financial support either to students or institu-
tions to help reach a goal or objective. If the entities have different goals and 
objectives, then they will likely need different financing strategies to achieve 
them. For example, colleges and universities may prefer merit-based grants 
over need-based grants because merit-based grants help them achieve their 
goal of maximizing their prestige or reputation, which is influenced by the 
profile of students attending institutions. Private foundations that seek to 
reduce gaps in college-participation rates by race/ethnicity or socioeconomic 
status are more likely to prefer grants targeted to specific students than to 
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appropriations or merit-based grants. And states will be more concerned 
than the federal government or private foundations with designing aid 
programs that help keep students—and the positive externalities that ac-
company them—in-state. The tendency, however, is for some policymakers 
to apply a one-size-fits-all approach to financial aid and judge federal, state, 
institution, and private aid programs by a single criterion such as whether 
they help equalize college-participation rates by socioeconomic status.
By viewing these three state funding options as being related to the same 
goal and recognizing that the state’s goal can be different from the goals of 
other entities that also support higher education, policymakers may even-
tually move beyond their ideological and political perspectives and design 
strategies that can capture the best aspects of each approach for states to 
achieve their goal. It is hoped that this result will then set the stage for future 



























Variable  Description              Sources
PctPost  Percentage of high school graduates from  Enrollment data were obtained from Digest of Education 
the previous 12 months who were attending any  Statistics for 1992–2008 and IPEDS for 1988. High school 
two-year or four-year postsecondary institution.  graduate data were obtained from WICHE. 
Includes only degree-granting, Title IV eligible   
institutions.  
PctPostI  Percentage of state high school graduates from  Enrollment data were obtained from Digest of Education 
the previous 12 months who were attending any  Statistics for 1992–2008 and IPEDS for 1988. High school 
two-year or four-year in-state postsecondary  graduate data were obtained from WICHE. 
institution. Includes only degree-granting, Title IV   
eligible institutions.  
PctPostO  Percentage of state high school graduates from  Enrollment data were obtained from Digest of Education 
the previous 12 months who were attending any  Statistics for 1992–2008 and IPEDS for 1988. High school 
two-year or four-year out-of-state postsecondary  graduate data were obtained from WICHE. 
institution. Includes only degree-granting, Title IV   
eligible institutions.  
PctPost4Yr  Percentage of high school graduates from the  Enrollment data were obtained from Digest of Education 
previous 12 months who were attending any four- Statistics for 1992–2008 and IPEDS for 1988. High school 
year postsecondary institution. Includes only  graduate data were obtained from WICHE. 
degree-granting, four-year, Title IV eligible   
institutions.  
PctPost4YrI  Percentage of state high school graduates from  Enrollment data were obtained from Digest of Education 
the previous 12 months who were attending any  Statistics for 1992–2008 and IPEDS for 1988. High school 





















Includes only degree-granting, four-year, Title IV   
eligible institutions.  
PctPost4YrO  Percentage of state high school graduates from the  Enrollment data were obtained from Digest of Education 
previous 12 months who were attending any four- Statistics for 1992–2008 and IPEDS for 1988. High school 
year out-of-state postsecondary institution. Includes  graduate data were obtained from WICHE. 
only degree-granting, four-year, Title IV eligible   
institutions.
PctBA  Percentage of adults (25 years+) whose highest  U.S. Census Bureau 
degree is a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
MedianY  Median household income by state and year.  U.S. Census Bureau 
Figure is adjusted for inflation (base year = 2008). 
PctBlack  Percentage of state residents ages 18–24 who  U.S. Census Bureau 
are Black 
PctHisp  Percentage of state residents ages 18–24 who  U.S. Census Bureau 
are Hispanic 
Fin  Total state financial support for higher education.  Derived from other variables 
Figure is adjusted for inflation (base year = 2008)  
and expressed on a per-capita basis (population ages  
18–24). Computed as FinA+FinN+FinM. 
FinA  State higher education tax fund appropriations.  Grapevine 
Figure is adjusted for inflation (base year = 2008)  
and expressed on a per-capita basis (population  
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Variable  Description              Sources
FinN  Total need-based state grant aid to college students.  National Association of State Scholarship and Grant Aid 
Figure is adjusted for inflation (base year = 2008)  Programs 
and expressed on a per-capita basis (population ages  
18–24).  
FinM  Total non-need-based grant aid to college students.  National Association of State Scholarship and Grant Aid 
Figure is adjusted for inflation (base year = 2008)  Programs 
and expressed on a per-capita basis (population  
ages 18–24).  
PctN  Percentage of total state financial assistance given in  Derived from other variables 
need-based grants. Computed as FinN/Fin. 
PctM  Percentage of total state financial assistance given  Derived from other variables 
in merit-based grants. Computed as FinM/Fin.
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